D. W. Peetz; III—Falsification in Science, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 69, Issue 1, 1 June 1969, Pages 17–31, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristo.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:76 AN UNNOTICED ERROR IN HUME'S TREATISE "...the conformity between love and hatred in the agreeableness of their sensation makes them always be excited by the same objects..." Treatise, Book II, Part II, Sec. X. This passage from Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature is taken from the first edition of 1739. It can also be found in the Everyman Edition, the editions of Selby-Bigge Mossner, and Green and (...) Grosse, without editorial comment of any kind. Yet it contains a glaring and obvious error. The most superficial reading of Book II will convince one that it is love and pride that conform in the agreeableness of their sensation they are both indirect passions that aire pleasant in feeling. On the other hand, humility and hatred share in being disagree able or unpleasant impressions. This might have been a printer's error, or Hume's own mistake, and the reason for it is not hard to find. This part of Book II was called "Of love and hatred" ; the expression "love and hatred" recurs several times throughout the whole. In ei»ther the writing of the manuscript or the type setting of the text, a habit was established. Habit, which Hume himself used to explain so much else, must here be cited as the explanation of this slip. What is more interesting is the reason why such an obvious error has gone so long unnoticed. Here an ambiguity in Hume's use of the word "object" should be noticed. It is sometimes used simply as a synonym for "thing" and this is the usage in "excited by the same objects". Hume is merely saying that love and pride have the same sorts of cause. When this cause is found in oneself it leads to pride and when in another it leads to love. This of course is connected with the fact that both these passions are aggreeable or pleasant in sensation. 77 "Object" also has a special technical use in Book II when it refers to the person towards whom the passion is directed, as in "the object of the passion". Now love and hatred do have a similar sort of object, i.e. another person, whereas the object of pride and humility is, according to Hume, always oneself. In this usage, the object of a passion is carefully distinguished by Hume from its cause. It is possible that a careless and superficial reading of this passage might lead one to think that Hume meant to say that love and hatred agree in having the same sort of object, i.e. another person. Such inattention is to be deplored, but after all, until very recently, such inattention was typical of the attitude of philosophers towards Book II 2 as a whole. D. W. D. Owen University of Stirling 1.See for instance the previous paragraph; "I have suppos'd all along, that the passions of love and pride, and those of humility and hatred are similar in their sensations, and that the two former are always agreeable, and the two latter painful." 2.Thanks are due to Mr. Roland Hall for checking the first edition on my behalf.... (shrink)

D W Hamlyn; How Does Knowledge Start? A Reply to Pamela Moore, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 137, https://doi.org/1.

Morally speaking, is abortion murder? This is what I am calling the ‘abortion problem’. I claim that neither pro-life nor pro-choice advocates have the correct solution; that the correct solution is instead one considered correct by relatively few people. But if this solution really is correct, then why, after years of intense debate, is this solution not more widely accepted? Many, no doubt, are precluded from accepting it by religious dogma. But others, I think, fail to arrive at a correct (...) solution because they have been approaching the problem from the wrong theoretical framework. Or they have been approaching it without any theoretical framework at all. That is, they have no theoretical framework beyond that of merely examining their moral intuitions and, if anything is clear so far from the abortion debate, it is that intuitions alone, which differ radically from person to person, are not sufficient to solve the problem. In short: one is unlikely to arrive at the correct solution unless one starts from a sound theoretical framework. I shall, in what follows, sketch what I take to be a sound theoretical framework. Then I shall try to show what solution to the abortion problem follows from it. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article:F.H. Bradley, Collected Works Volumes 1–5.

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This book is an attempt to provide an account of the conception of perception by way of a discussion of the conditions which may have to be satisfied for that concept to have an application. There is included, therefore, a discussion not only of perceptual experience but of the part played in perception by such things as conceptual understanding, belief, imagination, attention and activity. Although there is some reference to psychological work in the field of perception the main approach is (...) philosophical in an analytical style. Nevertheless, the book tends to eschew large gestures in the philosophy of mind, favouring an attention to detail in a way which some might describe as phenomenological. The author has written much about perception in the past and the book might be characterized as summing up a lifetime of thinking about the subject. (shrink)

D W Hamlyn; Reply to David E. Cooper, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 105–108, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.19.

D. W. Hamlyn; X—The Obligation to Keep a Promise, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 62, Issue 1, 1 June 1962, Pages 179–194, https://doi.org/10.10.

Books reviewed: Colin McGinn, Consciousness and its Objects, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2004, 256 pp. Reviewed by D. W. Hamlyn, Birkbeck College, University of London 38 Smithy Knoll Road Calver Hope Valley Derbyshire S32 3XW.